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The Economic Development of China 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prior to the early part of the 19th century, China’s economy had long been 
superior to that of the West’s. The Chinese’s ability to utilize science and 
technology had been instrumental in leading their enormous population to 
economic prosperity and for a while, superiority. During the 18th century European 
science and technology surpassed that of the Chinese. It is my contention that a 
variety of Chinese contributions expedited Europe’s prolific economic 
development and aided in its expansion. Perhaps with the assistance of 
innovations derived from China, the European economy was able to forge ahead of 
China’s. In addition to the Europeans developments there were several other 
contributing factors that led to the fall of the Chinese economy. Using historical 
background the latter part of this paper aim’s to explain the rapid growth that has 
recently occurred in China. In spite of substantial adversity, China has re-emerged 
as one of the most dominant economic forces in the world. To begin I will use 
historical background in an attempt to explain what China was able to contribute, 
both directly as well as indirectly to the development of Europe. It is also my 
objective to explain that a distinct correlation exists between Europe’s rapid 
economic growth and the fall of China during the 18th century.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to attempting to explain the long and rich history of the Chinese, it is 
important to lay the appropriate groundwork. A fundamental difference between 
the Chinese and the Europeans was and always has been their philosophical belief 
systems. This is an important piece of the puzzle concerning why Europe was able 
to develop so rapidly and why China’s economic prosperity ended just as fast. It 
was no doubt the philosophical or spiritual beliefs that most often guided the 
decisions of the influential Chinese and European leaders. It was those belief 
systems that led to decisions that subsequently shaped history. Obviously it is not 
feasible that entire populations of people could share the exact same spiritual 
philosophy. However, the Chinese main philosophy was Confucianism while the 
majority of Europeans believed in Christianity (Kang 2010, 25). 
 
CONFUCIANISM 
Confucianism is a belief system that is based on the teachings of Confucius. 
Confucius lived in China from 551 to 479 B.C. Confucianism can also be described 
as a philosophy model of human society and life (Kang 2010, 25-26). The idea of 
establishing such a system was because Confucius was troubled by the society in 
his life which was at the time period in China’s history marked by political 
instability and wars. A main component of Confucianism is virtues, such as 
respect, loyalty, honesty, hard work, politeness and generosity. Confucianism 
wants everyone to practice such virtues in order for the development of the 
harmonious society and a united peaceful China (Lockard 2009, 28-29). The 
Confucian code of conduct also calls for the observation of relationships. The 
superior must set a good example and the inferior must be obedient as well as 
submissive. Confucius created such a practical system of social hierarchy that 
many still follow it today. A prime example of Confucianism is the relationship 
between supervisors and employees. Another is the relationship between teachers 
and their students. Similarly, Confucius outlined basic relations in society that 
everyone needed to follow and observe. The first relationship is ruler over subject. 
The second is parent over child. The third relationship outlined is husband over 
wife. The fourth is older sibling over younger sibling. The fifth and final 
relationship that Confucius outlined was older friend over younger friend (SACU 
2001). In addition, Confucianism encourages paying back other people for their 
assistance and their kindness. Another teaching of Confucius was that the elderly 
have accumulated a lot of wisdom from life experiences and thus, should be 
treated with great reverence and respect. It was important that the elderly be 
honored by the young. This teaching unquestionably differentiated from the 
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European perspective on social relations which largely relied on a class system. 
The impact of Confucius teachings in China are so widespread that his code of 
conduct can be described as China’s code of conduct. This is because almost all 
Chinese live by the Confucian code of conduct. It is visible in China’s form of 
government. China has never succumbed to Democracy because that would imply 
that a younger person’s vote is equal to the vote of a wise elder. Confucius 
teachings imply that elders make natural leaders and can set good examples.  
“It was arguably the Tang dynasty (a.d 618-907) that made perhaps the 
most direct advances in governance, introducing a key institutional 
experiment that reflected these Confucian ideas: a government run by 
talent, not heredity, with civil servants selected through a public 
competition assessing candidates’ qualification, open (in theory) to all 
males and held at regular, fixed intervals” (Kang 2010, 31).  
From its inception, Confucianism has made not only a huge, but lasting impression 
on Chinese society. Over the years it has had a positive impact and more or less 
achieved Confucius’ goal of developing a peaceful and harmonious society in China 
that is not constantly at war. 
 
THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM 
Maybe the most important aspect of the rise of the Chinese economy was 
how the country conducted international diplomacy. Fundamentally, the Chinese 
realized relatively early on that war did not benefit anybody. Eastern Asian nation 
states adopted a ranking methodology by the 14th century known as the tribute 
system. The tribute system was a ranking system that, based on a variety of factors, 
determined the hierarchy of each nation state. Not all historians and scholars have 
been able to come to a consensus as to the extent or scope of tribute systems; most 
do believe that some arrangement, albeit formal or informal was used. It is clear 
that the Eastern Asian nation states were able to conduct themselves in such a 
manner that minimized war. “In fact, from 1368 to 1841 - from the founding of the 
Ming dynasty to the Opium wars between Britain and China – there were only two 
wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan: [ . . .]” (Kang 2010, 2). The 
system allowed the states to know where they stood in relation to each other. 
Military size and technology were among the factors that allowed China to 
dominate the region. By utilizing the tribute system many of the complications 
associated with international diplomacy were alleviated. For all of the nation states 
that abided by the arrangement, peace and prosperity proved tribute systems to be 
effective regarding diplomatic relations.  
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AGRICULTURE 
Chinese inventions were often “labor-saving” because of the large amounts 
of food that would be necessary to produce in order to feed such a large population 
(Needham 2004, 61). Again, pointing out the wheelbarrow as a perfect example. In 
China the abundance of food production was paramount in keeping the price of 
food low. Consequently, inexpensive food raised the standards of living for the 
Chinese. Its sizeable population had not been an issue for ancient China because of 
the attention that government gave the agriculture. 
“Of course in dealing with economic problems different dynasties in 
China devised different schemes. Yet in as much as certain background 
factors underwent little change, a number of common features in 
administration became perennial. One such feature was a vigorous and 
persistent promotion of agriculture by the State, virtually uninterrupted 
for 2,000 years” (Needham 2004, 50).    
Each dynasty recognized the importance of agriculture and consistently, often 
aggressively, disseminated the message.  
 
CHINESE IMPERIALISM 
Imperialism in China did not begin until the 3rd Century BCE. In 221 BCE 
Qin Shi Huang was able to destroy the other six states in the region and unite 
China. By conquering and unifying all seven states in the region, Qin Shi Huang 
was recognized as the first emperor of China. Qin Shi Huang introduced common 
coinage as well as a unified system of weights and measures. China’s first emperor 
even standardized the sizes of axels on carts that traveled on the Chinese roads. 
The Chinese have a long history of brilliant innovations and discoveries. Perhaps, 
it was the first emperor who introduced the people of China to the prosperity that 
accompanied technology and innovation. China, being one of the world’s oldest 
civilizations has contributed a lot to the West. In Science and Civilisation in China 
(2004), Joseph Needham listed some of China’s most noteworthy contributions to 
the West as well as the West’s approximate lag in centuries behind China. “In case 
after case it can be shown with overwhelming probability that fundamental 
discoveries and inventions made in China were transmitted to Europe, [. . .]” 
(Needham 2004, 20). Some of the more extraordinary contributions Needham 
listed were gunpowder, paper, cast-iron, magnetic compass used for navigation, 
the crossbow, wheelbarrow and porcelain. Needham went on to list over 250 items 
invented by the Chinese (Needham 2004, 223).  
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EARLY CHINESE INNOVATIONS 
The wheelbarrow is a prime example of Chinese innovation. The 
wheelbarrow was not known to be utilized in the West until the 1400’s, while it had 
been common in China since the 3rd century (Needham 2004, 4). Another quality 
that the wheelbarrow possess’ is that it was used as a labor-saver. It often appears 
that the Chinese would find a way to accomplish their goal that did not include 
practicing chattel-slavery. It was most likely the Chinese people’s ability to 
innovate and discover ways to increase productivity that enabled their economy to 
thrive before Europe’s. It was perhaps through innovation that labor-saving 
technology kept slavery from becoming a foundation for Chinese society. Slavery, 
unlike technology was extremely prevalent in Europe during the medieval period 
(Needham 2004, 227-228). 
The ceramics that were produced by the Chinese in the 16th century were 
especially attractive to the Europeans largely because of the brilliantly colored 
glaze finishes (Needham 2004, 113-114). Aeneas Anderson was one of the 84 men 
who accompanied Lord Macartney on his famous 1793 mission to China. In one of 
his letters sent back to Europe, Anderson commended China’s porcelain: “There 
are no porcelain shops in the entire world which can compare in size, richness or 
delivery with those in Canton” (Elman 2006, 80). It is apparent by Anderson’s 
enthusiasm that Europeans envied China’s wares. The premium quality of the 
ceramics from China spawned a wonderful reputation not only throughout Europe 
but the entire World. The phrase “fine China” was forever synonymous with high 
quality plate ware. Chinese porcelain was so highly sought after that many 
European’s tried, with little initial success to replicate it. Unfortunately, for the 
Chinese merchants, the European chemists were extremely persistent. By 1750 
European chemists had eventually figured out the Chinese’s secret formula. 
Europe quickly began mass producing high quality ceramics (Elman 2006, 80-81). 
Consequently, the once extremely lucrative Chinese porcelain industry suffered, 
while simultaneously improving the Europeans standard of living. Porcelain is a 
good example of how Chinese technology was able to contribute to European 
development. Porcelain, while only one good, clearly illustrates how it was possible 
that European success directly correlated to China’s economic downfall.  
Paper and printing are undeniably two of China’s greatest contributions to 
Europe as well as the rest of the World. China was the first nation in the world to 
have its own national currency (Needham 2004, 55). The Chinese were also the 
first people to develop wallpaper as well as the first to create toilet paper. 
Perfumed toilet paper was documented as being manufactured for the imperial 
family as far back as 1393 (Needham 2004, 205). The contribution of printing by 
the Chinese to the West, helped to launch the Reformation and the revival of 
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learning (Needham 2004, 53). Europe owes China an enormous amount of 
gratitude, or at least recognition for its printing contribution.  
In the West, especially in Europe, patents were an important process. Given 
the long list of innovations, it was unfortunate for the Chinese that they did not 
know anything about patents (Needham 2004, 224). The Chinese were very 
innovative people, constantly using technology to elevate their living standards. 
“China has the longest unbroken history of progress in science and technology 
(over 4,000 years) of any nation in the world” (Needham 2004, 224). However, 
the Chinese did not maximize the capabilities of all of their innovations and 
discoveries. A possibly causality could be that China did not foster an environment 
that was conducive to the entrepreneurial spirit. “Inventions in themselves, 
however, do not foster or inhibit science” (Needham 2004, 225).  
Despite China being more technologically advanced than the West for so 
many centuries, Needham believed one of the many reasons that China had not 
ever experienced an industrial revolution was because many of the Chinese 
inventions were used mainly for the amusement of the emperor rather than 
moving an economic society forward. A perfect example would be how gunpowder 
was primarily used as entertainment in firework displays for the Imperial court. 
The innovation of gunpowder did not have the same effect on the people of China 
as it had on the Europeans. Europeans quickly embraced the discovery and utilized 
it as a tool for destruction. “The strange thing is that China was able to absorb 
these earth-shaking discoveries and inventions while Europe was gravely affected 
by them” (Needham 2004, 53). Needham also thought that the European social 
class system played a big part in the Industrial Revolution originating in the West 
(Needham 2004, 230-231). Europe’s social class system of feudalism would 
ultimately prove instrumental in the rise of modern science in Europe. In Imperial 
China a social class system was not as prevalent as it was in the West. “The Chinese 
had the inventiveness, but lacked the social conditions for the elaboration of 
modern science” (Needham 2004, 14). 
Although modern opinion is beginning to change, many historians, 
especially European historians accredit the British imperial dominance of China to 
the technological supremacy of the Europeans. It is true that modern science and 
technology propelled the Europeans ahead of China. But, the contributions made 
by China bridged the gap for the Europeans (Needham 2004, 231).  
BLACK DEATH 
  During the 14th century a plague known as Black Death, would undeniably 
change the world. Black Death was one of the most devastating contagions that 
man had ever experienced. The first outbreak of the plague was believed to have 
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originated in China in the early 1330's. Trade between Asia and Europe had been 
increasing considerably, and in 1347, ships thought to be infested with rats from 
China reached Sicily. The ship’s had brought the disease with them. Since Italy was 
the epicenter of European trade and politics, this provided an ideal opportunity for 
the disease to spread. The plague, being carried by the rats, was conveyed to 
humans by the fleas that were living on the rats. The plague hit cities first and then 
quickly infected the rural regions. The Black Death spread so quickly, by 1350 one-
third of all Europeans were dead (McHenry 1992, 297-298).  
The plague did not discriminate amongst the social classes; many of the 
European rulers were dead. Ultimately the plague allowed the wealthiest 
European’s the opportunity to gain control of their country. The wealthy and 
educated Europeans quickly seized control. The feudal system established in 
Europe made the transition of power almost natural. “The Black Death struck not 
only Western Europe but also the Mongol Empire, including China where it had 
originated. But in China no bourgeois arose to take control” (Needham 2004, 230). 
There were several predominant reasons why there was never a bourgeois 
revolution in China. Primarily, the Chinese had long benefitted from a stable 
government as well as the establishment of bureaucracy (Needham 2004, 231-
232).  
The plague which had originated in China changed Europe forever. A claim 
can be made that inadvertently, China contributed to European prosperity by 
reducing its population. Black Death more than just devastated medieval Europe; 
it caused significant economic and social changes in all areas of the world 
(Needham 2004, 230). Fernand Braudel, an economic historian determined that it 
was in fact Black Death that had intensified the recession that had been going on 
since the turn of the century in the European economy (Braudel 1984, 78). The 
severity of the recession caused economic and societal changes to significantly 
speed up between 1350 and throughout the 1400’s.  
The power once possessed by the church had deteriorated. The role that the 
church played in society had also changed. The plague had decimated so many that 
a large number of Europeans began to question their faith in the church. 
Acclaimed sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein believed that the collapse of the 
church was one of the four elements that led to the European bourgeoisie gaining 
and then keeping power (Needham 2004, 229). Killing such a large number of 
people, Black Death radically transformed the workforce in Europe. The severe 
labor shortage brought on by the plague drastically affected the economy. Labor 
was in high demand and subsequently, commanded higher wages. In 1351 
England’s King Edward III instructed his parliament to establish the Statute of 
Labourers, a policy designed to freeze wages during the labor shortage. Further 
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turmoil ensued in response to the wage caps that were put in place. The plague 
that originated in China ultimately changed the European, as well as the world 
economy forever.  
THE JESUITS  
The Jesuits began arriving in China during the latter part of the Ming 
Dynasty, around the 1580’s. This time period in China was one of great economic 
prosperity as well as governmental disarray. “Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607), for 
example, entered Macao in 1579 and initiated a Chinese mission in 1582” (Elman 
2005, 64). The Jesuits mission in China was twofold. The Jesuits primary objective 
while in China was to convert the Chinese to Christianity. However, with them they 
had brought the understanding of European science and technology. From the 
onset the missionaries assumed that European science and technology would 
surely be far more advanced than anything that the Far East had previously been 
exposed to. “Europeans increasingly thought themselves scientifically and 
technologically superior to others after 1500, but neither the Chinese nor Japanese 
agreed with this perspective [. . .]” (Elman 2006, 11). Initially the Jesuits had 
believed that their superior knowledge would aid them in converting the Chinese 
to Christianity. The early Jesuits categorically underestimated the skepticism of 
the Chinese. “Ruggieri introduced European mathematics, mechanical clocks, and 
prisms to gain favor among local elites near Guangzhou” (Elman 2005, 64). The 
latter Ming and early Qing governments experienced a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the Jesuits.  
Among other things, the Chinese emperors received intellectual insight 
from the Jesuits regarding cosmology and mathematics that led to a monumental 
breakthrough in calendar reform. It was only because of the Jesuits understanding 
of Western science and technology that they were ever permitted in China in the 
first place. While in China spreading their spiritual beliefs, the Jesuits had the 
opportunity to learn many new things. Surely, the Jesuits conveyed their newly 
acquired knowledge to scholars back in Europe. It is well documented that the 
Jesuits introduced European ideas to the Chinese. What is not as clear is, while on 
their mission to China, exactly how much new information the Jesuits were able to 
transfer back to Europe. A classic example of this type of knowledge transfer would 
be when Michael Piotyr Boym, a Jesuit who served the Southern Ming in the 
1650’s, took the Map of the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo tu), circa 1652 back to 
Rome in 1656. “The original manuscript conveyed Jesuit knowledge of China to 
Europe” (Elman 2005, 130). It is difficult to quantify with any level of certainty, 
how much the Chinese contributed to the European Jesuits later scientific 
discoveries. An impressive list of relevant discoveries makes it is obvious that the 
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Chinese have an outstanding history of innovation. It makes intuitive sense that 
the Jesuits would often, intentionally or not, fail to credit the Chinese for 
knowledge that they transferred back to Europe. Language barriers made history 
difficult to pass down accurately. Often words did not precisely translate from one 
language to the other. Given our present day understanding of language it is 
reasonable to contend that a lot of information, especially intricate details more 
than likely could have been lost in translation. China certainly, at least for a short 
time, benefitted from European science and technology. What has always been less 
evident is that the Europeans, while in the Far East, were simultaneously gaining 
an equal amount of knowledge from the Chinese.  
The Chinese intellectuals were undoubtedly interested in capitalizing from 
the Jesuits understanding of the physical sciences. However, they grew tired of the 
religious message that accompanied the European Jesuits. The Chinese 
acknowledged and appreciated the utility of Western science but had no interest in 
expanding on, or developing any open trade policy with the Europeans.  
“The Ming and Qing imperial court induced Jesuit mathematical, 
astronomical, military, and mensuration experts to work as minions in 
the government bureaucracy to augment each dynasty’s own project of 
political and cultural control. Consequently, it would be a mistake to 
underestimate Chinese efforts to master on their own terms the Western 
learning of the Jesuits in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries” (Elman 2006, 13). 
It was only fitting that Benjamin A. Elman, a professor of East Asian Studies at 
Princeton titled his 2005 book on science in China, On Their Own Terms. Elman’s 
choice of title fit seamlessly with the mentality of the Chinese intellectual elite 
during the early part of the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese appreciated the knowledge 
shared by the Jesuits from the West. However, while appreciative they did not feel 
obligated to extend the Europeans any further courtesies. Many of the Chinese 
scholars shared the mentality of “thanks, but we will take it from here”. 
EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN CHINA 
   Prior to the 19th century China was a very self-sufficient nation. China’s 
strong markets had put the nation in a position of economic prosperity. The 
English continued to use science and religion as their primary means of diplomacy. 
Through those channels they were hopeful that China would eventually agree to 
open international trade that was not so deeply regulated. “British Protestants-
secular and religious- perceived the Qing empire as an obstacle to open commerce 
and Christian evangelism” (Elman 2006, 100). While expansion of trade would 
benefit both nations, the Europeans had more to gain from trade with China.   
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Since the eighteenth century, the Chinese government had enacted severe 
limitations on foreign trade, and was both apprehensive and disapproving of 
foreigners. Direct oceanic trade between China and Europe began during the 
sixteenth century. At first trade was led by the Portuguese and the Spanish. They 
brought silver to China from the Americas to trade for silk. Later the Spanish and 
Portuguese were joined by the British and Dutch. Originally trading took place at 
several ports all along the Chinese coast, but gradually the Chinese government 
restricted Western trade to only one port, Canton. The port at Canton was the only 
market open to foreign commerce. The Chinese preferred to limit international 
trade to one port so that the government could more easily collect taxes 
(Tagliacozzo 2011, 234-235). The Cohong were a group of merchants licensed by 
the Chinese whom were granted exclusive trading rights to deal with the 
Westerners. For the British side, the East India Company, granted approval from 
the King, similarly had a monopoly of trade with both India and China. The E.I.C. 
purchased silks and tea from the Chinese but did not have that much to offer in 
return except for silver.  
For many years this system was acceptable to both the Chinese and the 
Europeans. As the demand for tea increased and the Industrial Revolution led the 
Europeans to expand their manufactured goods into more markets, the British 
began to try to expand their trade opportunities in China. The British assumed that 
they were going to establish Western-style diplomatic relations with the Chinese. 
As stated earlier, the Chinese had historically utilized a tribute system with all 
issues pertaining to international diplomacy. The Europeans attempted to use 
Western-style diplomacy to expand trade with China. The most famous attempt by 
the British to expand European trade with China was made by Lord Macartney in 
1793. Professor Immanuel Chung-Yueh Hsu, a scholar of modern Chinese 
intellectual and diplomatic history at the University of California at Santa Barbara 
outlined Lord Macartney’s mission to China. Macartney’s mission had six main 
objectives:  
1. To acquire one or two places near the tea- and silk-producing and the 
woolen-consuming areas, where the British traders might reside and 
English jurisdiction be exercised.  
2. To negotiate a commercial treaty with a view to extending trade 
throughout China if possible.  
3. To relieve existing abuses at Canton. 
4. To create a desire in China for British products.  
5. To arrange diplomatic representation at Peking.  
6. To open Japan, Cochin China, and the Eastern Islands to British 
commerce (Hsu 1995, 156-157). 
The British led European Imperialists desperately wanted to have some sort of 
social, economic or political influence in China (Hsu 1995, 155). For a long time the 
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Europeans did not have anything that the Chinese viewed to have exceptional 
value. China did not have the desire nor need to adopt European technology. “In 
1793, when the British envoy Lord Macartney arrived in China and proposed the 
opening of trade, Emperor Qianlong famously replied, ‘we possess all things. I [. . 
.] have no use for your manufactures’ ” (Vogel 2011, 695). It was not until the 
Europeans imperialized India that they discovered their opportunity to permeate 
the Chinese markets. India was rich with opium, which would turn out to be 
extremely lucrative for the Europeans.               
Opium became instrumental in affording Europe the opportunity to exalt its 
influence in China. Opium had previously been available in China despite being 
officially prohibited by Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing Dynasty in 1729. It was 
because of the abysmal effects associated with the drug that recreational use of 
opium had also been banned in Europe. Historically, opium had been rather scarce 
in China. The scarcity of the narcotic in China consequently drove the price way 
up. The British East India Company was able to establish a monopoly on the 
opium trade and in-turn they were able to deal it exclusively to the east (Elman 
2006, 101). The opium market was of substantial economic significance to the 
British. The profits that were flooding in from the commodity contributed 
considerably to the revenue of the British Imperialized India. The British 
government also benefitted from the tax that was levied on the tea that was being 
imported from China at the same time. Additionally, the merchants who traded the 
opium obviously benefitted as well. The opium was trafficked primarily by the 
British East India Company into China (Elman 2006, 100). The result, a severe 
illegal opium trade had spawned and the Europeans were directly profiting at the 
expense of the Chinese (Elman 2006, 6).   
Essentially, opium sales to China were profitable for everyone, except the 
Chinese. Ultimately, the Europeans introduced millions of Chinese people to the 
highly addictive narcotic. During the 1820’s many Chinese became addicted to the 
European supplied opium, it had become an epidemic. “From 1823 to 1824, 
$8,515,100 of opium was shipped to China” (Tagliacozzo & Chang 2011, 94). The 
people of China had become addicts and quickly began trading their countries 
precious resources away for drugs. 
From the 1820s forward, British trade with China was in surplus. The 
enormous expenditure of Chinese silver used to purchase the illegal opium greatly 
exceeded the amount that the merchants spent on Chinese tea. From 1828 through 
1836 more than $38 million poured out of Qing China to import the illegal drug 
(Elman 2006, 100-101). For the first time an imbalance of trade had formed and 
China was on the losing end. The Chinese economy suffered tremendously due to 
the influx of opium being supplied by the Europeans. 
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The Qing emperor understood it was imperative to stop the British 
merchants from continuing to poison his people. Emperor Qianlong gravely 
overestimated diplomacy. The British did not rely on any form of tribute system. 
Europeans, specifically the British were primarily concerned with nation building 
by any means. Diplomacy would prove ineffective when dealing with the European 
Imperialists. Emperor Qianlong did not completely grasp the extent to which the 
Industrial Revolution had propelled the Europeans naval warfare capabilities 
(Elman 2005, 254-255). Had the emperor completely understood the 
consequences of not opening up China to trade with the British, he more than 
likely would have been inclined to ease his policies regarding the expansion of 
international trade.  
THE OPIUM WARS 
From a military standpoint, the Chinese were not prepared to go to war with 
the British. The Industrial Revolution that had taken place in the West severely 
handicapped the Chinese navy. The British naval ships had been seriously 
overhauled and the upgrades would swiftly overwhelm the Qing fleet. The Chinese 
fleet was largely a coastal navy which was used primarily to ward off local 
marauders and defend against pirates (Elman 2005, 193). The success of the 
British was predominantly attributed to superior naval technology. The aggression 
and imperialist nature of the British had led them to utilize technology to develop 
weapons capable of conquest. The British had superior ships, artillery, rifles, and 
they were fueled by greed. Jeffery Needham pointed out in Science and 
Civilisation in China that the Chinese had discovered paddle-wheel boats and 
ships as far back as the first century (Needham 2004, 218-219). That specific 
technology had not been recorded in Europe until many years later. Low and 
behold, it was the shallow draught iron paddle-steamer, named the Nemesis that 
would end up terrorizing the Pearl River delta. The iron hulled Nemesis destroyed 
Chinese fortifications and naval vessels at will. The British fleet simply 
overwhelmed the Chinese. A discovery contributed by the Chinese centuries earlier 
had been improved upon by the Europeans and used as an instrument of war. By 
the end of the First Opium War it had become obvious to the Qing Emperor that 
the technological advances made by the Western military had somehow managed 
to quickly surpass his country’s defensive capabilities.  
In order to end the bloodshed, the Chinese were forced by the British to 
agree to some severely lopsided peace terms. The terms were highly favorable for 
the British (Elman 2006, 101). Being so heavily outgunned, the Chinese Emperor 
had little choice but to agree to the lopsided terms set by the British and sign the 
Treaty of Nanking. There were four major consequences of the First Opium War. 
The first peace term of The Treaty of Nanking involved China giving Hong Kong to 
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England. Secondly, five ports, including Canton and Shanghai, were required to be 
open to trade as well as permanent residence (Elman 2005, 286). Import tariffs 
were then reduced to a maximum of 5%. Possibly the hardest pill for China to 
swallow was the extraterritoriality clause that allowed all foreigners who resided in 
China to be exempt from Chinese laws (Tagliacozzo & Chang 2011, 380-381). The 
extraterritorial concessions surrendered local sovereignty over to the British 
Crown. The British, by way of military strength, forced China to open its country 
up to the opium trade in the 1840's. China also experienced social turmoil in the 
form of the bloody Tai Ping rebellion, and was unable to prevent foreign 
domination of its trade. By the end of the 19th century, England, Germany, Russia, 
Japan, and the United States had all obliged China to trade with them. Russia 
occupied Manchuria and Port Arthur, Japan was in Korea, Germany was in the 
Shantung peninsula, and the British were in Hong Kong. 
The Second Opium War was in many ways an unavoidable sequel to the first 
war. The Chinese were not ready to implement the terms of the Treaty of Nanking 
largely because they viewed it as being unfair. The biggest problem for China was 
that the Treaty of Nanking did not address the opium issue. Opium smuggling 
continued, and this only increased Chinese resentment of the foreigners. British 
merchants were unhappy because they did not see a huge rise in profits from trade 
with China after the First Opium War like they had anticipated. They attributed 
their displeasure to the Chinese purposely taking too long to implement the newly 
agreed upon policies (Encarta 2003, 321-322). Still, clever Chinese diplomacy and 
a number of other political distractions kept the conflict from further manifesting 
itself for a number of years. War with the British inevitably ensued and the 
superior power of the Europeans and their refusal to compromise culminated in 
the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin. This time the British would require among 
other things that China open up ten new ports to foreign trade. The Chinese 
resistance ultimately led to an 1860 European invasion of the Chinese capital and 
the burning of the Summer Palace. British leaders required the Convention of 
Beijing on the defeated Chinese, establishing once and for all the right of foreign 
diplomatic representation in China's capital (Elman 2006, 160-161). Many 
restrictions on foreign travel within China were removed, and missionaries 
received the right to work and even own property in China (Elman 2005, 357-358). 
The opium trade, which spurred the entire conflict, was finally legalized. 
The Opium Wars are extremely important to China's modern economic 
history. “China itself was forced to give special access (the ‘unequal treaties’) to 
certain European countries” (Kang 2010, 160). The two wars, and the unfair peace 
treaties that Europe had imposed on China, weakened their political, social and 
economic structure (Tagliacozzo & Chang 2011, 96-97). The Opium Wars were a 
pivotal point in both the European and Chinese economies. The British and 
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Western penetration and colonization of China had spawned a whole new 
socioeconomic class. Wealthy Chinese merchants imported British goods and 
enabled the annexation of local markets and resources. The greed of the British 
Imperialists forced unprecedented levels of exploitation and taxation on the 
growing population of Chinese peasants and workers. China’s rulers were obliged 
to pay the war debts and finance trade deficits imposed by the treaties drafted by 
the Western imperial powers. The government was essentially forced to over tax 
the poorest of poor Chinese. This drove countless peasants to starvation and often 
insurrection. The speed at which the Europeans were able to prosper forced the 
Chinese to reevaluate the way that their country was being governed. The Opium 
Wars led the Chinese to begin “a new era of reform known as Self-Strengthening” 
(Elman 2006, 161). The Qing dynasty recognized that China had fallen behind and 
that they must evolve in order to survive.  
Historically, China had based its economic dominance on non-interference 
in the internal affairs of its limited trading partners. The teachings of Confucius 
and their regional tribute system had previously afforded the Chinese people peace 
and economic prosperity. In sharp contrast, the Europeans, specifically the British 
imperialists, intervened violently in China, rearranging local economies to suit the 
needs of their empire. The British eliminated economic competitors and 
monopolized industries (Tagliacozzo & Chang 2011, 126). Within a few decades of 
the colonial powers arriving from Europe the tribute system and Confucian order, 
both of which had been a monumental part of Chinese society for over two 
thousand years had collapsed (Kang 2010, 159). The British imposed their will on 
the people of China and by force they eventually seized control of local political, 
economic and governmental establishments. Chinese bureaucrats and wealthy 
merchants sought to appease the British Imperialists and were able to convince the 
emperor to grant debilitating extraterritorial concessions that, detrimental to 
Chinese manufacturers, opened its markets to the world. Adding to the strains that 
they had by this time put on the Chinese economy, the British, guided by greed 
would continue to cause internal rivalries and revolts that would continue to 
destabilize the collapsing country throughout the 19th century. 
Less than a century after the Opium Wars had ended, China, assisted by the 
Europeans, had plummeted and was no longer a dominant economic world power. 
The main arterial trading ports were controlled by European imperial officials and 
the rural areas were usually governed by corrupt and ruthless warlords. 
“Between 1841 and 1979, East Asia experienced interstate wars, 
colonization, anticolonial independence wars, struggles with state 
building, domestic insurgencies, ethnic violence, the cold war and a 
massive U.S. military, economic, and social presence” (Kang 2010, 160).  
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China had been reduced; it had transformed relatively quickly to become a 
fledgling nation with a massive impoverished population comprised of drug 
addicts. The once prideful, Chinese, had been broken. The people of China were 
humiliated and ashamed of what had been allowed to transpire. It is my 
contention that opium and violence were among the principal reasons that the 
Europeans were so successful in turning the economic tables on the Chinese. 
Another central cause was the social structure (Confucianism and the tribute 
system) that had existed in China for so long. This social structure is perhaps why 
China as a nation, did not adapt effectively to the challenges posed by the Western 
nations after the Industrial Revolution.    
COMMUNISM  
  Imperialism ended in China when a revolt that began in late 1911 was able 
to successfully overthrow the Qing dynasty. The Republic of China began to take 
shape and by 1912 the Chinese Nationalist Party emerged. The Nationalist Party 
could not maintain control and lost power by 1916. The lack of a unified 
government allowed warlords to thrive and the rest of the country to struggle. 
Despite once being a world power, by the late 1920’s China was not even a unified 
country. By 1921 civil unrest caused by the Treaty of Versailles led the people of 
China to a revolutionary movement. China was formally unified under the Chinese 
Communist Party and all other names of communist groups were dropped in July 
of 1921 (Cultural China.com). The Communist government was able to abolish the 
extraterritorial privileges granted by the European imperialists. China was able to 
experience modest economic growth up until the war with Japan escalated in 1937 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 267-269).  
The People’s Republic of China formed in October 1949. The Communist 
party, then unified under Mao Zedong began the process of reforming China, 
which many believe was unsuccessful. The Communist Party’s organizational 
discipline and propaganda, combined with Mao’s loyal soldiers formed a strong 
governmental structure. Mao’s system of government was able to infiltrate deeper 
than the imperial system, into China’s countryside and urban areas (Vogel 2011, 
13).    
China, led by Mao, was able to lower inflation, restore fiscal balance and 
revive the money economy (Perkins 1966). The economy in Mao’s China, despite 
short disruptions because of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
had in deed made some progress. The World Bank estimated that between 1950 
and 1975, China demonstrated (in certain areas) remarkable improvement with an 
average annual growth of 4.2 percent per capita GNP (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 19-
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21). While this was positive, it might not have painted a precise picture of just 
exactly how well the people of Mao’s Soviet style China were in fact, actually doing.  
 Even though China was a low-income country, they chose to pursue a 
strategy of high science and technology. Even before Mao, Chinese scholar Kang 
Youwei and other reformers had been aggressively pursuing the industrialization 
of China through science and technology. 
“In his 1905 essay on industrialization, for instance, Kang emphasized 
that China, like Japan, needed to master mining, industry, and commerce. 
Because machines had augmented the power of European states and 
enhanced the welfare of the people” (Elman 2006, 202).    
Many countries had been of the mind-set that pursuing an industrial oriented 
society would lead to quicker development than that of an agricultural one. At the 
time, economists often recommended political leaders to direct all investments 
toward industry. Agriculture, despite historically being a vital component in the 
countries prior success, did not receive equal attention from the government. 
Countries that followed that advice usually experienced brief gains, followed by 
failed development efforts (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 467; see Timmer).    
China modeled their national system after the Soviets organizational 
structure of research and development (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 191; see 
Naughton). Growth during 1958-1978 was primarily made possible by the high 
rising rates of capital accumulation. That accumulation simply replaced 
productivity enhancement as the dominant contributor to GDP growth. Research 
by Lardy (1984), Bramall (1989) among others showed that China’s rural majority 
were not able to experience much if any improvement in their living standards 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 842).  
The inability to significantly improve the quality of living standards for the 
people of China clearly indicated the ineffectiveness of Mao’s innovation system. A 
leading cause had been attributed to the total factor of production in the 
agricultural sector. In 1979 the total factor of production was lower than it had 
been previously in 1952, an important point that was highlighted by Chow (1989). 
During a similar period, a contrasting study of the industrial sector showed slight 
growth (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 86-88). It many peoples opinion, Mao focused too 
much of China’s resources on industrial initiatives. The government needed to 
prioritize and focus even more of its attention, like it had done so effectively in the 
past, on agriculture.       
The neglect of rural investment led agricultural productivity to be low, 
which inflated the cost of food. Property rights, weak incentives for farmers and 
the lack of markets all resulted in poor agricultural output. The Chinese 
infrastructure and lack of transportation prevented food from getting from the 
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farms to people's homes before it spoiled. Poor management of the land 
simultaneously exhausted the soil and the water supply. The low productivity of 
China’s agricultural industry resulted in severe food supply shortages that 
manifested into famines. The country, while indicating many positive signs of 
growth, had a gigantic problem on its hands. The country’s food supply was an 
obstacle; that, given China’s past agricultural successes and innovation should 
have been a relatively easy to situation to overcome. In order to improve the 
economy, Mao and the rest of his party needed to immediately address China’s 
food supply crisis. Instead, according to Ezra Vogel, Mao chose a different course 
of action, “an ill-advised utopian debacle that led to massive food shortages and 
millions of unnatural deaths” (Vogel 2011, 13). Sadly, 30-40 million Chinese died 
of starvation in a short span of only three years, from 1959-1961 (Brandt & Rawski 
2008, 191-192). The country would eventually try to tackle this crisis from two 
different angles. They would look to produce more food, for less people.  
China would once again need to restructure its governmental system in 
order to successfully transition back to prosperity. Mao’s Soviet style Communism 
promoted isolationism and had been suppressing China’s progress. “When China’s 
leaders made the decision to initiate economic reform in 1978, the top leaders, 
especially Deng Xiaoping, understood that their system had been profoundly 
damaged by the final twenty years of Maoism.” (Brandt 2008, 93, see Naughton). 
The new leaders intended to bring the economy back to life and restore order to 
the broken socialist political system.   
Deng Xiaoping thought that in order to permanently revitalize China, 
among other reforms, a shift in the countries education system was needed. If the 
country were going to become competitive in the global economy, they would need 
to focus on academics. Mao’s previous system regarding university entrance exams 
would need to be revised. Mao’s eventual successor Deng Xiaoping, believed that 
the most qualified students should be admitted into the university, period. Mao’s 
earlier methodology of “proper class background” had allowed wealthy imbeciles 
into the university instead of intelligent peasants (Vogel 2011, 205).  
CAPITALISM  
In 1980 China’s government, headed by Deng Xiaoping, began to undergo a 
dramatic change in its economic strategy: Over the next thirty or so years, China 
opened the country to extensive foreign investment. Deng believed that 
competition from foreign companies would force Chinese businesses to become 
stronger (Vogel 2011, 476). Chinese industries were finally allowed to privatize. 
This privatization in turn, set in motion a process of income concentration founded 
on a measured strategy of reconstructing a dominant economic class connected to 
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overseas capitalists. Severe competition was created across many industries. “A 
large number of new (mostly small) firms were founded in most transitional 
economies” (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 68,). The profit erosion that ensued because 
of competition urged many existing enterprises to search for revolutionary 
processes and product innovations in order to ensure their survival.               
The Chinese government re-directed enormous public subsidies to 
encourage large amounts of capitalist growth by dismantling its tired national 
system of free public education and health care. They also ended subsidized public 
housing for hundreds of millions of peasants and urban factory workers; deciding 
instead to provide funding to real estate investors for the construction of private 
apartments and office high-rise buildings (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 737). China’s 
new capitalist approach as well as its rapid growth was founded on the insightful 
structural modifications and substantial investments made possible by Mao’s 
regime. The boom in China’s private sector was established by the huge public 
outlays that had been made since 1949. It was Mao’s initial investment in China’s 
infrastructure and industry that paved the way for capitalisms success. Through 
ample research many scholars have determined China’s rapid economic growth 
initially began closer to 1950 than 1980. Also, that growth was based on the 
development of its internal market; it’s rapidly growing corps of scientists, skilled 
technicians and laborers. Additionally, the societal structure which both protected 
and promoted the working class and peasantry were products also yielded from 
Communism. However, if the once great nation was going to survive in the global 
economy, the country desperately needed to embrace the necessary economic 
reforms.  
REFORM        
China’s earliest and most important economic reform policy was the 
household responsibility system (HRS) that was introduced to the agricultural 
industry. “Starting with the restoration of household agriculture in the late 1970’s, 
China has implemented a long sequence of increasingly coherent, focused, but still 
partial, gradual, and yet unfinished economic reforms” (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 
20). HRS was implemented in rural areas between 1978 and 1983 in an effort to 
increase agricultural output. The Mao system of commune style farming that had 
been allowed to decimate the agricultural industry would be replaced with a more 
productive incentive based system (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 169-170). During the 
reform era, China was able to increase its food production to the point that they 
were able to become an exporter (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 469-471). “Once the 
reform began, every possible metric confirms that China’s farm sector surpassed 
results achieved during the previous three decades by enormous margins” (Brandt 
& Rawski 2008, 475). Food production had finally outpaced the growth in 
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population. The immediate impact that the reform policies had created, instilled a 
higher level confidence of the people in the government.  
In an effort to manage its population growth, Chinese leadership introduced 
a policy in 1979 that would allow couples in certain regions to have only one child. 
The leadership firmly believed that the sudden rapid growth in population that had 
taken place over the prior few decades had been the root cause of China’s turbulent 
economic times (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 138). The tempered growth in China’s 
population had a positive impact on the overall productivity. During the course of 
a typical human’s lifespan, people are only productive during the middle of their 
lives. When people are young or old, they obviously consume more than they are 
able to produce (Brandt & Rawski 2008). China’s one-child policy temporarily 
solved a crisis, but it at the same time was creating what would eventually manifest 
into a whole new problem. However, the Chinese leadership, through decisive 
reform was able to manage their way out of the initial crisis; they will do the same 
with the new one. 
 Modern China’s rise to becoming a world economic power is based on its 
enormous productive capacity. Output per worker has tripled in China between 
1980 and 2004. Only India has come close to being able to compete with China’s 
productivity (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 26-27). 
 In 1978 China had only 12 firms directly controlled by the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, which were authorized to conduct foreign trade. By 2001 that 
number had ballooned to over 35,000 (Lardy 2002, 40-42). “When Deng became 
preeminent leader in 1978, China’s trade with the world totaled less than $10 
billion; within three decades, it had expanded a hundredfold” (Vogel 2011, 697). 
Regarding trade as well as investment, China has always operated under a strict 
policy of non-interference when it comes to the internal affairs of its trading 
partners. Unlike the West, China did not constantly participate in wars for natural 
resources; instead its government chose to enter into lucrative contractual 
agreements for its desired commodities. 
China has powerful trading, financial and investment networks throughout 
the world. Additionally, China has a host of powerful economic partners which 
share a vested interest in their continued success. These partnerships have become 
essential for the sustained growth of many countries throughout the developing 
world. “China’s adoption of one of the developing world’s most open trade and FDI 
regimes stands as one of the most significant accomplishments of the reform era” 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 676). While foreign capital began to profit in China, it did 
so within the agenda of the government’s priorities and regulations. The 
government’s dynamic export strategy combined with an ingenious monetary 
policy has led to giant trade surpluses. These surpluses have afforded China to 
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become one of the world’s largest creditors, especially for United States debt. In 
order to maintain its position among these industries, China must regularly 
procure enormous amounts of raw materials. In order to facilitate the continued 
procurement of these materials, China has large-scale foreign investments and 
trade agreements with agro-mineral export countries from around the world. 
China has replaced the United States and Europe as the main trading partner in 
many countries.  
China’s ruling politicians at first, more or less embraced the idea of pirating 
technical intellectual property and accessing overseas markets from foreign firms 
in exchange for providing cheap, labor that was well below the going market rate. 
The sustained growth in China’s manufacturing sector has been a result of highly 
concentrated public investments, high profits, technological innovations and a 
well-protected domestic market (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 24). China’s leadership 
realized that innovation needed to be a priority. They understood that 
technological advances were going to play a vital role in guaranteeing the future 
success and sustainability of their economy. By 1985 China had restructured its 
patent laws and identified its shortcomings with dealing with intellectual property 
rights (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 294). In December of 2001 China was accepted into 
the World Trade Organization and officially recognized as a valued partner in the 
world’s economic community.  
  Throughout history Chinese leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that it 
prefers diplomacy to military strength. “Throughout the 1980’s, then, the Chinese 
government decreased the proportion of the budget going to the military” (Vogel 
2011, 541). Deng Xiaoping preferred to keep military expenditures down in order 
to channel more resources to advance the civilian economy (Vogel 2011, 545). As a 
result of that investment, China has been able to improve its GDP on an average of 
9.5 percent annually between 1978 and 2005 (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 878). On the 
other end of the spectrum, the United States military spending is more than five 
times greater than China’s and its economy has stalled (Shah, 2012). It appears 
that once again China has chosen economic superiority over military power. China, 
with the second largest economy in the world is in glaring contrast to the largest 
economy, the United States, where an enormous military force continually erodes 
its civilian economy. The Chinese have decided to invest the majority of their 
resources in their people’s futures and not in foreign wars.  
CONCLUSION   
It is my contention that a variety of Chinese contributions expedited 
Europe’s prolific economic development and aided in its expansion. Perhaps with 
the assistance of innovations derived from China, the European economy was able 
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to forge ahead of China’s economy. In addition to the Europeans developments, 
there were several other contributing factors that led to the fall of the Chinese 
economy. Though modern opinion is beginning to change, many historians, 
especially European historians accredit the British imperial dominance of China to 
the technological supremacy of the Europeans. It is true that modern science and 
technology propelled the Europeans ahead of China. But, the contributions made 
solely by China as well as knowledge achieved by teamwork amongst both the 
Europeans and Chinese alike is what bridged the gap for the Europeans to propel 
ahead (Needham 2004, 231). It is my contention that opium and violence were 
among the principal reasons that the Europeans were so successful in trading 
economic places with the Chinese. Another central cause was the social structure 
(Confucianism and the tribute system) that had existed in China for so long. This 
social structure is perhaps why China as a nation, did not adapt effectively to the 
challenges posed by the Western nations after the Industrial Revolution. The 
examples given should help to explain that a distinct correlation does in fact exist 
between Europe’s rapid economic growth and the fall of China during the 18th 
century. In spite of substantial adversity, China has re-emerged as one of the most 
dominant economic forces in the world. China has quickly earned the position as 
the world’s second largest economy and is poised for much continued success. 
Modern China, as a world power, is exceptionally stronger than it was.     
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